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A r e  P a r o d y  a n d  D e c o n s t r u c t i o n  
Secretly the Same Thing? 
Robert Phiddian 
Does the principal purpose of Sec [Derrida's pet 
name for his essay "Signature Event Context"] 
consist in being true? In stating the truth? 
And what if Sec were doing something else?1 
S THESE TEASING QUESTIONS hint, deconstruction does not aspire 
in a straightforward way to be a discourse of truth. It is 
interested in questions of truth,  but i t  does not pursue 
them in the direct,  serious, and analytic fashion of speech-act 
philosophers like John R. Searle or of traditional hermeneutics. In the 
subjunctive voice, it might be "doing something else,” but what? 
Derrida goes on to outline his essay's (and philosophy's) uneasy 
relationship with truth, exclaiming "How is it possible to miss the point 
that Sec,  from one end to the other,  is concerned with the question 
of truth, with the system of values associated with it, repeating and 
altering that system, dividing and displacing it in accordance with the 
logical force of the iter, which `ties repetition to alterity."'2 Repetition, 
alteration, iterability: these doublings and distortions of truth into 
language are what fascinate Derrida, rather than truth as essence or 
truth as brute fact. He looks at the effect of truth in language with 
the eye of neither an idealist nor an empiric, but a parodist. Long 
ago, Gregory L. Ulmer argued that "part of the difficulty of Derrida's 
oeuvre is that it may be the first fully developed theory ever couched in 
the parodic mode."3 Much in Derrida's work demonstrates the accuracy 
of this perception. However, I want in this essay to take this point further 
and to turn it around, to argue that Derridean deconstruction is not 
just a (serious) theory couched in a parodic mode (that it is a parodic 
theory of language), but also that it treats language and questions of 
truth and reference as if they were already in a play of parody (that 
it is a theory of parodic language). Though some recent work is 
beginning to look at ways of taking it less "seriously,"4 this is 
decidedly not the way it has generally been received in the academic 
community, so the first thing I have to do is to make a space for this 
argument in the context of thought about deconstruction. 
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NEW LITERARY HISTORY 
I. The Range of Deconstruction 
Deconstruction can, among other things, be read as a rethinking of 
Western philosophy, or as a rhetoric of textuality and absence. I take the 
second path because I  am not intel lectually equipped to assess 
deconstruction as a challenge to philosophy, and I am temperamentally 
disinclined to believe either (a) that it is on the verge of destroying 
civilization as we have known it, or (b) that it is on the verge of creating 
new heaven and new earth, beyond logocentrism. So, for my purposes, 
deconstruction is a thoroughgoing rhetoric of traces and absences in 
language, a theory of textuality, and a powerful (if occasionally point-
less) way of reading. This essay's interest in it is tactical rather than 
fundamentalist, and the tactics that I will focus on are those connected 
with interpreting texts. 
As a method of interpretation, deconstruction came to fame as a 
hostile way of disfiguring texts, as, according to Mark Edmundson's 
persuasive argument, an attack by philosophy on literature.5 In an act of 
hermeneutic violence, i t  sought to expose and exploit  the gaps, 
blindnesses, contradictions, and aporias in texts that make naive claims 
to truth, beauty, reason, structure, progress, mimesis, and the like. 
Paradoxes, inconsistencies, and unconscious contradictions (conceived 
psychoanalytically, politically, or in a spirit of formalist rigor not wildly 
different from New Criticism) were exposed, especially in Romantic 
texts, and their implications were teased out in more or less tendentious 
ways. This seemed exciting in the 1970s and early 1980s, but employing a 
skeptical method to undermine texts which are naive about their truth 
claims is really rather easy, and it rapidly becomes repetitive.6 A few of 
these deconstructions provided interesting and rigorous investigations 
of the terms of and biases in the production of meaning in texts. A lot 
lapsed into empty, odorless formalism or the vandalism of mere "radical-
ism."7 From this distance, it seems obvious that, if you employ a method 
which assumes that all texts are fragmented, decentered, and contain the 
seed of their own negation, you are liable to keep generating interpreta-
tions which purport to discover that individual texts are fragmented, 
decentered, and contain the seed of their own negation. Your readers 
are within their rights both to wonder whether the tail is wagging the 
dog, and to lose interest after a while. After all, only the dullest positivist 
or flakiest idealist is capable of staying shocked even in the medium 
term by "the discovery" that authorial or structural meaning cannot be 
fully determined in language. Mimesis is a powerful illusion, but I can 
think of no age and few hermeneutic theories so completely under its 
sway that they have denied the possibility of irony and ineradicable 
ambiguity, even from seemingly straightforward statements. This is 
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obvious, and it is not new. Did a straw-formalist ever exist who refused to 
believe that the meaning of a text could be anything other than a fully 
determinate core of objective and timeless significance? It's not impos-
sible. But whether or not he or she ever existed in the world, he or she 
has had a mighty run in hermeneutic fiction, reinvented endlessly by 
deconstructors who need a target at which to aim their "radical" 
interpretations. This fictional target even proves so stationary that it 
allows deconstructors to pretend that the failure of absolute determinacy 
in interpretation necessarily leads to absolute indeterminacy. Moreover, 
by a very deconstructible failure of self-consciousness, it allows them to 
ignore the fact that even they are making themselves understood 
(functionally, if not perfectly) when they assert that understanding is 
unavailable.8 If everything truly were radically indeterminable, either we 
can not know this fact, or we can know only this fact, and all further 
discussion and interpretation are pointless. Even if this were true, 
nothing can follow it, except an infinite and subjective play of signifiers.9 
I do not deny that this sort of intellectual and rhetorical extremism 
can reasonably be extrapolated from aspects of Derrida's theory and 
practice.10 Defenders of Derrida's rigor, who deny that the Master ever 
takes the primrose path of flaccid indeterminacy or can reasonably be 
identified with the slack intellectual habits exercised in his name, are 
telling only part of the story. To protect Derrida from charges of silliness, 
they have to read his works selectively and under the guidance of his 
sternest statements of purpose, often suppressing any sense of the 
playfulness of his texts and explaining his ideas into a very different and 
more sober register from that employed in Derrida's own prose. Having 
tacitly saved him from himself for serious philosophico-critical dis-
course, they explicitly set about saving him from his opponents, and 
from his legion of misguided supporters, who misunderstand his mes-
sage and garble it abroad in irresponsible and inaccurate forms. These 
more or less patient explicators—I am thinking here of authors such as 
Gayatri Spivak, Jonathan Culler, Christopher Norris, Vincent Leitch, 
Kevin Hart, and Geoffrey Bennington11—perform a heroic task in 
processing Derrida as a serious theorist, but they do not succeed in 
creating a lone, authentic Derrida. They have to rely too heavily on 
selective reading in what is a large and miscellaneous body of work, and 
on the ancient "evil ministers" argument, which holds that, as the King is 
by definition good and wise, errors committed in his name must be the 
fault of his evil ministers or, in this case, his stupid and biased 
publicists who appropriate his ideas for selfish and dubious ends.12 
Moreover, even among the serious redactors, there is no semblance of 
agreement on a single and consistent Derrida. There is no reason in the 
logic of deconstruction why there should be. The figure of the arduous 
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interrogator of Western metaphysics may be a more intellectually 
respectable and interesting construction of Derrida than that of the 
archprophet of absolute free play, but it, too, is a partial representation 
of the thinker and the thought. These partial and asymmetrical interpre-
tations are what the skeptical tradition and the common principles of 
deconstruction should have taught us to expect. But before we pass on 
to my own necessarily partial explanation of what it is all about, we need 
to pause briefly over another very common recension of the image of 
deconstruction. 
For there are those who insist that deconstruction is essentially 
political, and that it is a method for discovering the oppressed others 
beneath phallogocentric discourse. They use deconstruction as a herme-
neutic of suspicion, as an instrument for unpicking the structures and 
rhetorics of racism, patriarchy, psychological repression, class. This is 
logically valid as a version of deconstruction, and can be mightily 
politically useful. However, deconstruction is not a hermeneutic of 
suspicion in the strict sense identified by Kevin Hart as: "searching for 
an explanation which is concealed within what seems natural and 
inevitable."13 It does not discover occult truths that have been repressed, 
masked by false consciousness,  or distorted by logocentrism; it  
deconstructs. To tie it to particular political ends is an appropriation 
that requires a potent combination of blindness and insight (blindness 
concerning the discourse of the oppressed combined with insight into 
the false consciousness of oppression). It is a dangerous tool, because so 
corrosive—being no respecter of value, it can and will deconstruct your 
cherished categories as well as those you attack. It can be (and has been) 
used to support a rainbow alliance of liberationist critiques, but it can 
provide only negative liberation. The fullness of freedom or justice 
needs to be asserted after or beyond a deconstructive critique; it is not a 
necessary residue of that process. Consequently, deconstruction is 
political in the sense that it provides a powerful mode for questioning 
authority and the ideological and structural force on which it depends. 
Positive doctrines do not follow, however, except as supplements, the 
arbitrary quanta which simultaneously fulfill and displace the original 
method. For example, Edward Said's classic study Orientalism provides a 
politically engaged deconstruction of Western representations of "orien-
tal" cultures, but it is certainly not an act of "pure" deconstruction, 
though it is an act of major moral and intellectual importance. It is a 
hostile reading of an oppressive group of intellectual structures, and a 
"misreading" of them in many productive ways. It is not absolutely or 
totally true, it is not beyond metaphysical or ideological grounds, and it 
is not without its own blind spots. Its adherence to a moral and political 
argument is explicit and, in a philosophical sense, arbitrary. It is "unfair" 
to its colonialist and orientalist opponents, refusing to engage sympa-
thetically with their arguments, ideologies, and rhetorics, and it does not 
extend the same militant critical hostility to its own assumptions. In the 
real (mixed, fallen, political) world where people actually live, such an 
approach is urgently and contingently valid, and a better use of 
poststructural skepticism than even the most cunning dismantling of a 
Wordsworthian lyric. But it, along with all the other political dismantlings 
of binary oppositions, is lopsided and does not manage entirely to 
contain the deconstructive flow of language. 
Given his subject and his relationship toward it, Said's vigorously 
hostile and subversive deconstruction is inevitable. If you take the 
deconstructive toolbox to work on texts which you find ideologically 
repulsive, a mass slaughter of those texts' racist/fascist/capitalist/ 
phallocratic/logocentric assumptions is going to occur. Such engaged 
readings share a spirit of violation with the more formalist decon-
structions, which is one of the reasons the two paths mingle so indis-
criminately in a large body of criticism. There is, however, another way, 
which is the subject of the rest of this essay. Deconstruction is routinely 
used against the texts it studies, but you get a very different critical 
practice if you use it with another sort of textuality, with texts that 
consent to the movements of deconstruction, foresee them, and play 
within them—if you use deconstruction with parodic texts. I concede 
that this is an arbitrary constraint to put in place, but all applications of 
deconstruction must have a quantum of arbitrariness, as I have at-
tempted to show above. So, let us start at the outside of the onion. 
Deconstruction is presented by Derrida and his followers as a theory 
of all language, or (at least) of all writing. As grammatology soon 
expands to include speech (nothing more than a pale and derivative 
form of writing) and any leftover modes of language and thought on the 
principle that "there is nothing beyond the text,”14 it bids fair to be 
a grand theory of everything. One of the more grandiloquent 
characterizations of writing, taking in just about all of "Being," 
appears in "Signature Event Context": "I would like to 
demonstrate that the recognizable traits of the classical and 
narrowly defined concept of writing are generalizable. They would be 
valid not only for all the orders of  ` s igns '  and  for  a l l  languages  in  
genera l ,  bu t  even ,  beyond semiolinguistic communication, or the 
entire field of what philosophy would call experience, that is, the 
experience of Being: so called `presence."'15 It is hard to take so 
large a claim seriously, and I do not propose even to try. This is the 
sort of willfully contentious Derridean edict that, when taken as a 
statement of truth, leads to explicatory contortions among the faithful 
and snorts of contempt from the infidel. 
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Considering that deconstruction is a theory whose most characteristic 
proposition is that truths cannot be totalized and absolute grounds 
cannot be asserted, it seems safer (or, at least, valid) to stake a claim on 
a more restricted piece of turf. Most (perhaps all) theories of interpreta-
tion start as restricted economies, assuming a particular body of texts, 
issues, and values as a normative context. Medieval and modern herme-
neutics developed in response to biblical texts and theological concerns; 
practical criticism (New or Leavisite) is modeled on the problems raised 
by the lyric poem; Marxism and early feminism start from the realist 
novel, psychoanalytic criticism from dreams and fairy tales. The list 
could be extended, but, however tendentious particular matches in this 
very blunt list may seem, the fact remains that particular hermeneutic 
approaches work better with some sorts of texts than others, often for 
reasons that are approximately genetic. Hermeneutic theory and textual 
practice develop diachronically and dialogically—over time and in 
response to each other. Moreover, the body of texts normally gets the 
first word in the dialogue, so that the theory tends to develop in 
response to actual problems raised by texts, however grandly abstract its 
eventual pronouncements may turn out to be.16 There is, however, an 
imperial logic to theory that decrees that it should always expand to 
cover more material. The passage just quoted from "Signature Event 
Context" is a clear example of this very common tendency. So, the rot 
sets in when a theory has worked out the seam of its normative context, 
and the imperial logic of criticism decrees that it must conquer other 
forms of semiosis in an endless critical replication. The fit between 
criticism and its object gets worse and worse. The texts need either to be 
more rigorously selected or more comprehensively reimagined if the 
theory is to be further validated and take in more territory. As types of 
writing more distant from the original context are fed to the method of 
interpretation, the results become reductive (for example, the Leavisite 
proposition that there are only four or five or six great novelists in the 
English language—on a bad day, only D. H. Lawrence makes the 
grade—whose works are great because they express a muscular and 
organic felt experience not unlike that found in the best metaphysical 
poems), or oversophisticated (for example, the infinite politicization of 
courtly Renaissance texts by which new historicists endlessly discover 
silenced others and Marxist morals), or some combination of sophistica-
tion and reductivism. At a very simple and pragmatic level, the poor fit 
of method to genre can be seen in thousands of undergraduate tutorials 
and classes where long novels are unsatisfactorily discussed for an hour 
using the residually formalist method of close reading of selected 
passages. This is a method designed for lyric poems, and works quite 
well for them, especially when you have time to read and discuss an 
 
entire poem in class. However, it is ludicrously reductive to dispose of 
Middlemarch or Tom Jones by scrutinizing a few hundred words of each; 
it is just that long narratives tend to be treated that way to fit the traditions 
and exigencies of a literary pedagogy that developed out of a confronta-
tion with the dense textures of verse. 
The obvious assumption about deconstruction, especially in its English-
language reception, is that it is designed to deal (roughly) with 
Romantic and idealist texts. That is how it came into the practice of the 
Yale critics, and there are some remarkable exemplars of this sort of 
thing in Derrida's readings of Rousseau and Plato, or Barthes's reading 
of Balzac in S/Z. As I indicated above, however, "doing it" to structurally 
and intentionally naive texts gives a short-lived rush of radicalism then 
rapidly becomes tediously repetitive, unless it is energized by the pursuit 
of a moral or political argument or playfulness of Barthesian propor-
tions. Moreover, this image of deconstruction as a hermeneutic terroriz-
ing naive texts obscures a more pervasive modal relation to another sort 
of textuality that can be perceived in and around its practices and 
concerns. My suggestion is that the secret sharer of deconstruction is 
parody. To use deconstruction with parodies is to commit deconstruction 
with consenting texts rather than against victim texts, because parodies 
are already thematically and structurally about the play of absence, 
presence, and rhetorical illusion. Deconstruction does not discover 
shocking gaps in the mimetic illusion of parodic texts, because parody is 
not, in any straightforward sense, mimetic. Parody, as I shall go on to 
argue, is already actively and consciously engaged in intertextuality, so 
deconstruction does not provide the simply and negatively critical 
perspective on parodic texts that it provides on more naively positivist or 
expressive texts like orientalist tracts and Romantic poems. Parody as 
artistic practice and deconstruction as hermeneutic method are struc-
turally enough alike to mesh, and they are linked historically as well, for 
deconstruction is a major member of the body of theory that has 
developed in connection with the pervasively parodic concerns of 
modernism and postmodernism. Parody is an ancient art which, if it 
cannot logically be traced back to the first text, must have started at least 
with the second or third.17 However, the twentieth century has, in all the 
arts, been peculiarly obsessed with those doublings, repetitions, transfor-
mations, and sensations of derivativeness that can be categorized as 
parodic. Postmodernism is praised or damned for being relentlessly 
parodic, but it is hard to see how (or why) one might draw a line 
between it and the modernist avant-garde in the matters of quotation with-
difference that drive parodic semiosis. And this is also the long 
moment of structuralism and poststructuralism. 
This is the historical ground of possibility for my argument that, while 
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it has been applied promiscuously to all sorts of texts, for a variety of 
reasons of internal logic, deconstruction works best (that is, most 
intimately and creatively) with those works that defy and complicate 
mimetic assumptions, be they postmodern buildings, nouveaux romans, 
cubist montages, or Don Quixote. Parody did not need Derrida to tell it 
that mimesis is an imperfect and deeply paradoxical proposition in the 
complex play of presence and absence that constitutes signification. It 
knows that language differs from things and defers meanings into a 
prolonged (potentially infinite) play of echoes and substitutions. It has 
been playing with the conventions of authenticity (which make language 
as representation work) for centuries. While an aggressive enough 
deconstructive reading can make any text tell the story of its incapacity 
to escape the indeterminate play of language,18 parody invites such 
reading and faces it without unusual anxiety. From its basic moves, 
deconstruction frames all writing as parody in the sense that it treats it as 
caught up in a tissue of echo, allusion, appropriation, and misprision. As 
a mode of interpretation, it violates the broadly mimetic and expressive 
assumptions of "straight" writing and reads with the indirections of the 
"crooked." Obviously, writing does not fall neatly into two objective 
categories of straight (mimetic-expressive) and crooked (ironic); that is 
precisely the sort of binary opposition deconstruction teaches us to 
suspect, and it is more suspicious than most. But the distinction does 
mark a pragmatic difference between strategies both of interpretation 
and authorship, and it is a distinction clearly condoned by Derrida: 
"`Limited Inc ...' makes uncomfortable reading because it is written in at least 
two registers at once, for it answers to at least two imperatives. On the one hand, I 
try to submit myself to the most demanding norms of classical philosophical 
discussion.... On the other hand, in so doing I multiply statements, discursive 
gestures, forms of writing, the structure of which reinforces my demonstration in 
something like a practical manner.... This dual writing seemed to me to be 
consistent with the propositions I wanted simultaneously to demonstrate on the 
theoretical level and to exemplify in the practice of speech acts... . 
At the time, this wish was quite sincere. Today, however, the context having 
changed, I have decided to avoid writing here in this dual mode. Or at least to 
try, since it is not always possible, by definition.19 
This distinction between straight and crooked or single and dual modes 
is indispensable, and we may use it, if we remember that it works 
provisionally and does not enshrine an absolute or rigorous division of 
types of writing. 
II. Linking Parody and Deconstruction 
I'd like to go a step further, and assert that parody is a form of 
deconstruction. I want to assert this with all the force that metaphor can 
muster, with all the tropical force attributed to metaphor in "White 
Mythology." I'm not just arguing that parody is like deconstruction; I'm 
arguing that they are secretly the same thing. Consider this passage from 
Of Grammatology: "The movements of deconstruction do not 
destroy [sollicitent] structures from the outside. They are not 
possible and effective, nor can they take accurate aim, except by 
inhabiting those structures. Inhabiting them in a certain way, because 
one always inhabits, and all the more when one does not suspect it. 
Operating necessarily from the inside, borrowing all the strategic and 
economic resources of subversion from the old structure, borrowing 
them structurally, that is to say without being able to isolate their 
elements and atoms, the enterprise of deconstruction always in a 
certain way falls prey to its own work."20 It is clear that deconstruction, 
especially as Derrida practices it, nests in the structure of the texts and 
ideas it criticizes, as a cuckoo infiltrates and takes over the nests of 
other birds. It operates from inside the arguments of metaphysical texts 
and systems such as structuralism and phenomenology, showing how they 
cannot totalize the visions they proclaim, and precisely where they 
double and collapse. It is not primary thought, always secondary, 
always "borrowing all the strategic and economic resources of 
subversion from the old structure." And this is precisely what parody 
does too. It is preeminently a genre-bricoleur, living off the energies 
and inadequacies of previous writings, "borrowing them structurally" and 
transforming them with a critical eye. Don Quixote is in a deconstructive 
economy with romance, just as surely as Grammatology is in a 
deconstructive economy with Rousseau's theory of language; and in 
many similar ways. Umberto Eco's The Name of the Rose inhabits the 
rhetorical structure of the detective story, "operating necessarily from 
the inside, borrowing all the strategic and economic resources of 
subversion from the old structure." It does not destroy it "from the 
outside," and is, indeed, much more complicit with what it deconstructs 
than the blank idea of criticism suggests. It does not entirely repudiate 
the detective story, and actually "falls prey to its own work" by becoming 
a sort of costume detective story in turn; yet the detective story is also 
ironized and placed under erasure. It looks different after The Name 
of the Rose, and that difference looks very like a play of différance. 
Supplementary logics of criticism, reformulation, and homage are set 
up in parodies across many semiotic forms, from visual arts to drama, 
architecture to music, political rhetoric to lyric poetry. For the sake of 
some coherence of focus, however, I will proceed to draw examples 
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mostly from parodic prose fictions, though there is certainly no need to 
confine ourselves to twentieth-century illustrations. Don Quixote illus-
trates this supplementary relationship to its host genre, in that it attacks 
and ironizes romance, yet also becomes implicated in its logic and 
energy. Moreover, in its reception it has become a great early modern 
romance, and the Don himself has developed into so durable a romantic 
figure that (along with a multitude of filiations through subsequent art 
and literature) a musical comedy has been written about him—the Man 
of La Mancha supplements Cervantes'  own Don, and (for many) 
substitutes for the effort required to read the entire book. This compli-
cation of the work's dissemination might economically be explained as 
cultural perversity, but its exact congruence to the play of dangerous 
supplementation seems to tell much more about the book and its 
reception. The musical stands for the romance it supplants, mocking 
and becoming it at the same time. Similarly, Swift's A Tale of a Tub is 
literally unthinkable without the mad Grub Street textuality it both 
attacks and epitomizes. Its verbal texture is almost entirely made up of 
the texts it deconstructs, and its mad parodic energy comes from the 
debased discourses of Modernity (the late seventeenth-century version) 
rather than the Ancient founts of wisdom it is commonly held to 
endorse.21 Sterne's Tristram Shandy is a thoroughgoing investigation of 
the impossibility and absurdity of writing novels, written from within the 
novel's conventions. While it cavorts in every paradox and mimetic non 
sequitur it can find, it amounts to something very like a novel, and has 
even been described by Victor Shklovsky as "the most typical novel of 
world literature."22 This is a provocative proposition and seems, even in 
context, to be at least half a joke, but it does alert us to the very peculiar 
and intense intimacy that builds up between a parody and its host genre. 
This relationship oscillates and steadfastly refuses to be stabilized into 
any straightforward pattern of criticism or logical argument. Parodies 
deconstruct the discourses they invade; they do not blankly destroy the 
discourses on which, parasitically and critically, they live. Instead, both 
genesis and structure of those discourses appear "under erasure" (visible 
but problematized and devalued).23 Indeed, genesis in Tristram Shandy 
(the birth of the hero, a fact which most novels see fit to dispose of in the 
first chapter) is so thoroughly deferred by the problems that arise in the 
attempt to construct a realistic narrative that it does not occur until 
chapter 28 of volume 3, and little follows from it. Parodies can't live with 
their host discourses, and they can't live without them. 
A narrow definition would confine parody to a form of very specific 
ridicule where a recognizable piece of writing, painting, piece of music, 
or whatever, is imitated in a mocking manner. Clearly this narrow scope 
is not what I am discussing here, and the genre can and has been 
conceived much more broadly.24 A complex parody can involve not just 
a particular aesthetic object, but many kinds of discourse within its own 
structure. In Gulliver's Travels there are travel books, biography, children's 
stories, philosophical arguments, topical satire, and much more in the 
intertextual soup. A more recent plural text like Julian Barnes's Flaubert 's 
Parrot can parody a variety of different discourses in the same body of 
words, either serially (in the various genres employed in consecutive 
chapters) or simultaneously (in the way the book is structurally at once 
literary biography and fictional autobiography). The crucial point for 
parody is that the body of words is always preloved and redirected. It is 
never primary or whole or transparently mimetic at any level of 
authorial desire or readerly response. Parody is crooked, reflexive 
writing, with the instability of irony inscribed deep in its structure. If we 
read parody "straight" as sincere expression without relating it to a 
structure of criticism, we misunderstand it. 
In 1702, Daniel Defoe published what he thought was a parody of 
reactionary Anglican polemic in The Shortest Way with the Dissenters. 
He assumed readers would find the argument that dissenters should 
be executed or exiled self-defeating, and would learn to deconstruct 
the "high church" rhetoric as immoral, unreasonable, and 
dangerous. However, most of his initial readers read the piece straight, so 
dissenters were outraged at  what they saw as an at tack on them 
and high churchmen were annoyed to be told that so sensible a 
tract was supposed to be a joke. Defoe was put in the stocks for 
sedition, protesting often and unsuccessfully that his parody had been 
misread. What was meant to resonate ironically within discourse (or 
warring discourses) had been too readily and naively attached to the 
world.25 Literary hoaxes and causes célèbres show that parodic 
language is language in play and that, for parody to work, the players 
and readers need to understand the rules of the game. The Ern Malley 
affair illustrates how delicately poised the genre can be at a pragmatic 
level, and how dependent it is on being processed through the right 
intertextuality by its audience. During a slow day at the Directorate of 
Research and Civil Affairs in Melbourne during World War II, two soldier 
poets of classicizing temper, James McAuley and Harold Stewart, determined 
to cleanse Australian poetry of the excesses of modernism. They 
constructed a pastiche of fragments, quotations, and portentous lines, 
concocted a covering letter from a certain Ethel Malley about 
discovering these poems among the effects of her recently deceased 
brother, and posted the lot off to Max Harris, the editor of the newest 
and most ostentatious local journal championing modernism, Angry 
Penguins. Harris took the bait, read the poems straight, and announced 
the discovery of a great Australian poet to the world in a special issue of the 
journal. When 
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Stewart and McAuley caused the hoax to be exposed in the Sydney 
Sunday Sun, parodic reading of the works of Malley was suddenly and 
devastatingly activated, and there it might have ended, with both Malley 
and Harris deconstructed by ridicule. However, a further twist illustrates 
the potential volatility of parodic language, for another misguided 
straight reading occurred among some officers of the South Australian 
police, who proceeded to prosecute Harris for issuing an obscene 
publication. This resulted in a grimly absurd court case where the 
prosecuting counsel inspected the poems' language with a daft and 
obsessive prurience that read them as coded smut rather than as great 
modernist lyrics (Harris's view, which he maintained until his death in 
1995) or as parodic exemplars of a pointless and self-indulgent poetic 
(Stewart and McAuley's view).26 
These warring readings indicate that parody is an unstable process 
driven by the contexts in which readers place particular texts, rather 
than a set of formal properties. As a cultural practice, parody is language 
about language, and it resonates within semiotic systems. Derrida's most 
notorious statement, "there is nothing outside of the text," is absurd and 
dangerous enough if taken as a description of the world. That is the line 
of argument that denies even a pragmatically functional referentiality 
for signs, and leads to things like Baudrillard's denial of the Gulf War; it 
is easily refuted by the old Johnsonian test of kicking the nearest stone.27 
However, as a description of the workings of parody, the idea of nothing 
beyond textuality is a powerful one. Parody occurs within textuality. It 
resonates within language (or sign systems if it's painting, drama, or 
music), without attempting to break out on its own into the zones of 
pure representation or originality. As is apparent from Defoe's and 
Harris's fates, it does connect with the world, but not in the primary way 
claimed by mimetic writing. Parody never claims to represent a full 
presence; like deconstruction, it is always a play of language before it is a 
play of meaning. 
III. Two Metaphors for Parody from Deconstruction 
(1) Parody is a play of différance. 
The meaning of parody is never a stable entity, even in theory. It is a 
matter of relation and constant cross-reference between the parody and 
its model, between the present text and a variety of other texts. We 
cannot read parody as parody without being aware of how if differs from 
its model and what it itself purports to be on the surface. The reader's 
experience of relation is crucial, for parody cannot operate without the 
awareness of dialogue between texts and discourses. The ship's captain 
who insisted that he knew Gulliver well but that he lived at Wapping 
rather than Redriff may have read Gulliver's Travels, but he had not read a 
parody. Bakhtin's theories of heteroglossia and novelization have been 
enlisted to explain the function of dialogue in parody,28 and dialogism is a 
good model for understanding what happens, especially in relatively 
sunny works like Don Quixote and A. S. Byatt's Possession. However, it does 
tend to give a jolly sense that there is room for everything in the 
cornucopia of heteroglossia which does not always suit well with the 
hostilely deconstructive relations many parodies set up between texts. 
Barthes argues that "writing ceaselessly posits meaning ceaselessly to 
evaporate it, carrying out a systematic exemption of meaning,"29 and, 
while this is an extreme view if applied to all straight and much parodic 
writing, it captures the quality of many parodies (for example, A Tale of a 
Tub, Margaret Atwood's Handmaid's Tale, Kathy Acker's Don Quixote, and 
Thomas Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow) better than a model based on the 
linguistic plenitude of heteroglossia. Parody is often made up of 
multiple absences rather than multiple presences, and it often exhausts 
the discourses it inhabits rather than replenishing them. A way of 
imagining this basic trope of parody in its negative form is to read it as 
deconstruction and, more precisely, as a play of différance. Again, we have to 
read past the Derridean proposition that différance is a transcendental 
principle implicit in all language ("Nothing—no present and in-different 
being—thus precedes différance and spacing. . . . Subjectivity—like 
objectivity—is an effect of différance, an effect inscribed in a system of 
différance"30) to read it in a tactical sense as a description of a certain kind 
of language. If we allow this misprision, we can see that the parodic text 
differs from its model, but it also displaces and defers it. Compared to 
straight language (language trying to represent reality or the author's 
authentic opinions) parodic language is doubled and differentiated. It 
operates very much like this: 
Differance, the disappearance of any originary presence, is at once the condition 
of possibility and the condition of impossibility of truth. At once. "At once" 
means that the being-present (on) in its truth, in the presence of its identity and in 
the identity of its presence, is doubled as soon as it appears, as soon as it 
presents itself. It appears, in its essence, as the possibility of its own [duplication. That 
is to say, in Platonic terms, of its own] most proper non-truth, of its pseudo-truth 
reflected in the icon, the phantasm, or the simulacrum. What is is not what it is, 
identical and identical to itself, unique, unless it adds to itself the possibility of 
being repeated as such. And its identity is hollowed out by that addition, 
withdraws itself in the supplement that presents it.31 
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Again, Derrida makes a far larger claim than I need for the purposes of 
my argument, but the essential thing here is the image of parodic 
repetition both adding to and hollowing out its model. Inconvenient 
though it is to mimetic and expressive ideals of representation, without 
the possibility of parodic repetition, there could be no communication. 
Languages are systems where distortion and deferral are always 
available, and this parasitic possibility is enacted most 
comprehensively by parody, for parodies exist in a critically 
deconstructive relation to their models. The point is not that a parody 
simply overpowers its model, just as the erasure of différance does not 
merely obliterate the concept called up. In parody, as with différance, 
the trope is one of oscillation between positive and negative polarities. 
Brian McHale has identified this flicker between presence and absence as an 
abiding characteristic of postmodern fiction,32 and this anomalous 
spacing of discourses is also the simultaneous moment of parody and 
différance. 
Parodies stand for the things they displace, but they do not merely 
repeat them, as translations aspire to do, or extend them like imitations. 
They displace, distort, differ, and defer. Derrida argues that différance 
is both a spacing and a temporization.3 3 Parodies distance us 
from identification with both the model discourse and the parodic 
text, sett ing us on a constant commuting between deconstructed 
and deconstructing poles/venues. We arrive at a "true" 
understanding of neither text, because each constantly displaces the 
other. The structure of each is made to differ from itself so that it 
cannot inhabit a single logical space. And each image is rendered 
provisional, a temporary relation of mutual hostility and incongruence 
in the mind of the reader, in which the origin and aims of the host are 
subverted by the other's. The intellectual structures of alchemy 
and its mimetic goals and assumptions are employed for the time 
being as a conceptual structure for Eco's Foucault's Pendulum, even 
as, in the same motion, they are being ridiculed as absurdly 
disconnected from the real world. The parody ironizes and 
destabilizes them, but it does not obliterate them. Moreover, the real 
world begins disconcertingly to lose definition in the face of hermetic 
relations and displacements. Just as Casaubon's, Belbo's, and 
Diotallevi's lives are invaded by the "Diabolicals," so the novel is 
invaded by the logic of the Rosicrucian texts it parodies. This is precisely the 
way Derrida suggests that the sign works in his essay on "Differance," and I 
would argue that parodic signs, as least, oscillate in this way. 
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(2) Parody "... that dangerous supplement." 
The supplement is the trace of différance in the structure of a sign which 
makes full presence impossible. It supplies both what is necessary, and 
what is extra to a sign (the paradoxical double meaning of the word). 
In Of Grammatology, Derrida pinches a phrase from Rousseau to 
describe writing as "that dangerous supplement" in relation to speech. He 
does this in order to unpick the priority we assume of speech (which has 
the wholeness of a voice informing it) over writing (which logocentric 
discourse considers to be the potentially misleading signs left behind by a 
departed vocal presence). Derrida labors to overturn the Platonic 
opposition that ranks the Socratic voice above alphabetic scribblings. 
For him, speech offers no authentic self-identity between speaker and 
meaning. It is just another form of writing, in which previous texts are 
quoted and stitched together into new texts to suit the present purposes. It 
is more delusive than the written word at least insofar as it claims a 
greater fullness of presence and authenticity. In his habitual spirit of 
paradox, Derrida proclaims that writing (the idea of a text) is the 
supplement which makes speech possible; and it is also the trace of différance 
(of previous and future texts) which waylays the possibility of a pure or 
authentic message and pushes the dreams of reference and 
representation into the endless play of language. As Ellis demonstrates, it 
is ludicrous to argue as historical facts the propositions that speech had 
always (until 1966) been privileged over writing (think of all the legal 
codes and religions of the book) or that speech is impossible without 
writing (even now, completely oral cultures continue to exist) (AD 19-
21). Derrida does seem, at some level, to want his readers to believe 
these assertions as empirical truths, and some of his redactors have even 
tried to explain and propagate such a belief, but they neither are nor can 
be facts. Ellis, displaying his wonted lack of sympathy for Derrida's 
rhapsodic and playful rhetorical style, then asks himself "what is Derrida's 
argument trying to do?" (AD 21), and proceeds, predictably enough, to 
fail to come up with even a remotely satisfactory answer. Should 
anyone still wish to treat grammatology as a valid and coherent science 
of language, these historical fallacies in its most fundamental premises 
must be recognized as fatal. However, as enabling misprisions that can 
defamiliarize conventional assumptions and give us access to a view of 
some language's weirder qualities, the propositions have their uses. A 
philosophy of language like Derrida's, built largely on paradoxes and puns, 
is not a likely contender to replace linguistics or historical philology, but 
it attends better to the evasiveness and inadequacy of words than a positive 
science of language (committed as it must be to the dissipation of 
ambiguity) ever could. 
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So, if we entertain Derrida's premises, it follows that the supplement 
of writing is both necessary and dangerous. It makes the sign work, even 
as it undermines its mimetic claims. It transmits and distorts at once, and 
we cannot do without it. This is how he describes it: 
Writing is dangerous from the moment that representation claims to be 
presence and the sign of the thing itself. And there is a fatal necessity, inscribed 
in the very functioning of the sign, that the substitute make one forget the 
vicariousness of its own function and make itself pass for the plenitude of speech 
whose deficiency and infirmity it nevertheless only supplements. For the concept 
of the supplement—which here determines that of the representative image—
harbors within itself two significations whose cohabitation is as strange as it is 
necessary. The supplement adds itself, it is a surplus, a plenitude enriching 
another plenitude, the fullest measure of presence. It cumulates and accumulates 
presence. It is thus that art, technè, image, representation, convention, etc., come 
as supplements to nature and are rich with this entire cumulating function. This 
kind of supplementarity determines in a certain way all the conceptual opposi-
tions within which Rousseau inscribes the notion of Nature to the extent that it 
should be self-sufficient. 
But the supplement supplements. It adds only to replace. It intervenes or 
insinuates itself in-the-place-of; if it fills, it is as if one fills a void. If it represents 
and makes an image, it is by the anterior default of a presence. Compensatory 
[suppléant] and vicarious, the supplement is an adjunct, a subaltern instance 
which takes-(the)-place [tient-lieu]. As substitute, it is not simply added to the 
positivity of a presence, it produces no relief, its place is assigned in the structure 
by the mark of an emptiness. Somewhere, something can be filled up of itself, can 
accomplish itself, only by allowing itself to be filled through sign and proxy. The 
sign is always the supplement of the thing itself. 
The second signification of the supplement cannot be separated from the 
first. We shall constantly have to confirm that both operate within Rousseau's 
texts. But the inflexion varies from moment to moment. Each of the two 
significations is by turns effaced or becomes discreetly vague in the presence of 
the other. But their common function is shown in this: whether it adds or 
substitutes itself, the supplement is exterior, outside of the positivity to which it is 
super-added, alien to that which, in order to be replaced by it, must be other 
than it. Unlike the complement, dictionaries tell us, the supplement is an "exterior 
addition." 34 
I suggest that we should not try to read this as an encyclopedic account 
of language, but rather substitute "parody" for "writing" and "supple-
ment" throughout the passage. It is a misreading, in a way, but the idea 
of parody as the dangerous supplement attaching to "straight" writing 
has a great deal of explanatory power. To anthologize and alter: 
"[Parody] is dangerous from the moment that representation claims to 
be presence and the sign of the thing itself.... The [parody] adds itself, it 
is a surplus, a plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest 
measure of presence.... But the [parody] supplements. It adds only to 
replace. It intervenes or insinuates itself in-the place-of; if it fills, it is as if 
one fills a void. If it represents and makes an image, it is by the anterior 
default of a presence.... But their common function is shown in this: 
whether it adds or substitutes itself, the [parody] is exterior, outside of the 
positivity to which it is super-added, alien to that which, in order to be 
replaced by it, must be other than it." A parody brings out the possibility 
of its own ridicule in a text. It is the deconstruction which is always 
available. It comes from the margins of a preexisting text or discourse, 
supplementing it dangerously: giving it what it lacks (its own implicit 
critique), giving it what it deserves (a vision of its own absurdity), and 
taking its place (decentering it and overcoming it). 
Parody enacts the impossibility of any text, however "straight" its 
aspirations, managing to totalize and stabilize its own meanings. It could 
always be written differently—rewritten by a parody which decenters the 
original and aspires to replace it. Indeed, it can still and always be 
rewritten by parody, which doubles and deconstructs the tropes of 
authenticity on which "straight" writing depends. Any past or future 
biography of Flaubert will always be deconstructively supplemented by 
the gaps, paradoxes, and multiple possibilities drawn out in Flaubert's 
Parrot. Joseph Furphy's Such is Life shows just how long and inconsequen-
tial a Bulletin short story would have to be if it really wanted to represent 
Australian bush life accurately. After Gulliver's Travels we will never 
entirely trust a travel book again. Tristram Shandy shows that the germ of 
its own absurdity lies more or less dormant in novelistic realism, before 
that genre's great age in the nineteenth century. After the fact, Ulysses 
repeats the dose on the novel and attaches further supplements to 
Homer and sundry other discourses. Jean Rhys's Wide Sargasso Sea gives 
voice to a version of the story of Empire that Jane Eyre and Victorian 
Britain preferred to ignore. Thomas Mann's Doctor Faustus supplements 
various versions of German identity, from the pure aspirations of music 
and theology to the pollutions of Nazism. Parody is the parasite genre 
that can attach to any other, supplementing it dangerously, living off its 
mimetic, expressive, or rhetorical energy, and reminding it and us that 
we are facing words rather than things, rhetoric rather than pure ideas, 
language rather than phenomena. 
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IV. Why Parody Usually Turns into Satire, 
but Deconstruction Mightn't 
I have made a case for the proposition that parody and deconstruction 
are the same thing, but I would like to finish by putting a twist in this 
argument. It is clear that parody and deconstruction revel in preloved 
language and disseminations of original meaning and structure. For 
both, there is a sense in which there is nothing beyond the text.  
However, while parody is deconstruction, it is not pure or mere or entirely 
textual deconstruction. There is a risk for deconstruction, as Derrida and 
others practice it, that it might be entirely consumed by and in the 
indeterminate play of language and lose sight of the fact that there is 
more in heaven and earth than is dreamt of in its philosophy. That 
philosophy and a very great deal of attendant poststructuralist thought 
depend too naively on a couple of seminal assumptions made at the 
beginning of this century that have often led to questions of referentiality 
being bracketed out of theories of language and of literature. The 
Russian Formalists developed a poetic that treated parodic writing as 
normative, in the sense that they considered language literary only 
insofar as it defamiliarized discursive conventions. Indeed, when Shklovsky 
called Tristram Shandy the most typical novel of all, he was referring 
solely to the book's semiotic structures and deliberately turning a blind 
eye to the ways that semiosis might connect with meanings and the 
world. This focus on defamiliarization at the expense of any mimetic or 
expressive concerns was in the way of an operating assumption for 
Shklovsky and his fellows rather than a definitive statement about any 
rigid autoreferentiality in literary language, but it is an assumption that 
has been much followed, and it has shown an alarming tendency to 
harden into dogma, among both formalists and those who claim to 
deform formalism. Paul de Man's insistence, alluded to above, that "[i]t is 
therefore not a priori true that literature is a reliable source of 
information about anything but its own language,"35 puts the hard 
version of this case in deconstructive discourse; it is an operating 
presumption for much "American deconstruction," and is also retriev-
able from aspects of Derrida's work. Even more important than this 
residual formalism has been the shadow of unexamined conformity cast 
by Saussure's most important enabling hypothesis, the proposition that 
"in language there are only differences, and no positive terms."36 As a 
counter to the relentless historical empiricism of nineteenth-century 
philology, this proposition was ground-breaking, for it allowed language to 
be analyzed as a system, in its synchronic aspect. However, Saussure did 
not mean to deny that language operates diachronically, just that his sort 
of analysis had to ignore that vector. Too often, Saussure has been  
read as putting a hermetic seal on language that renders the notion of 
referentiality indefensible. As Ellis argues, this is a silly interpretation of 
Saussure, and it is certainly a silly argument about the way language 
operates in the world, yet it is one of the most habitual poststructural 
positions (AD 45-66). While it brings with it a reasonable supply of 
counterintuitive insights, the blindness this line of argument requires is 
not finally defensible. 
I do not propose to defend it. Rather, I propose that parody, as a 
genre, has already seen its way out of the deconstructive impasse that 
treats language as an endless and odorless play of differences. For it is 
true that parody, generically in its forms and linguistically in its textuality, 
works on fundamental assumptions about the nonreferentiality of 
language and form very like these, but it normally does so cannily, 
knowing that language does connect with the world, mimesis, and 
intention, however messily. That is where and why parody nearly always 
turns into satire. This is not a necessary event—pure parody which 
bombinates endlessly in the void of textuality is at least imaginable—but 
parody nearly always admits referential impurity. Its first lesson is always 
to defamiliarize, to show that language forms, distorts, and masks the 
world, that it is an impure medium, and that pure referentiality is a crazy 
and often dangerous dream. However, there is almost always a supplementary 
movement in parody (that seldom accompanies deconstruction) which 
returns the reader to something resembling the world. Through it, the 
play of differences in language is also defamiliarized, disrupted by physical 
realities and social, moral, and political imperatives. For, while the pure 
echolalia imagined by deconstruction, and enacted in the more 
aimless moments of texts by Derrida and others, is not critical in any 
meaningful sense, the comic aspects of parody do generate critical 
perspectives. These are not the objective critical perspective desired by straw-
Plato metaphysics (the sort of dumbly serious logic that deconstruction 
loves to torment); rather they tend to be an unstable array of critical 
perspectives dependent on reader competence and response. Through 
these filters, language connects with both expression and mimesis, 
always ironically and never entirely earnestly. Political implications may 
(usually will) follow from this, but they will not necessarily be of any 
particular color. 
Parody knows that reference occurs, despite language. It shows that 
there can be no monolithic Scriptural reality, on the one hand, and on 
the other that there are things beyond texts and which texts cannot 
control the construction or operation of. The Don fights with real 
windmills. Gravity's Rainbow represents a real world war and its 
aftermath—the point may be that the world has become surreal,  
but experience (physical, emotional, even moral) does not evaporate merely 
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 because it becomes conceptually problematic. Parody does not provide 
the easy consolation offered by the trick with mirrors that mere 
deconstruction plays when it suggests that everything that can be 
deferred and deconstructed (which is everything) is mere absence. 
Dublin is textualized in Ulysses, but its sounds and smells and the people 
in it continue to exist even as they become mythopoetic wraiths, 
infinitely deferred in the parody. Those who follow the story around the 
streets and pubs of Dublin on Bloomsday are not mere gulls of naive 
realism. They know what they and the book are doing (at least for the 
first few pints). In another register, The Handmaid's Tale pursues an 
urgent political argument about individual liberty in the face of commu-
nal, military, and linguistic oppression, through the body of a parody of 
science fiction; a diminuendo of multiplying absences is precisely not 
what occurs in Atwood's work. Though the logic is altogether more 
paradoxical and supplementary, the fatwa shows how the verbal play of 
the Satanic Verses attaches to textual and material reality. The argument 
that the novel "is just a fiction" has never been an honest or a good 
defense for Rushdie, because he was clearly writing about India, Britain, 
and Islam. The text operates in a way liable to offend a fundamentalist 
because it relativizes sacred narratives (and not just Islamic sacred 
narratives—it works over several of the cherished narratives of English-
ness, empire, and liberalism), and it does not treat them with anything 
like the respect they think they deserve. Parody is not serious or even 
polite in the face of claims to the sublime, but it is not just a joke. 
Indeed, it is logically and philosophically opposed to the absolutist 
claims and mimetic frauds sublimity depends on. Consequently, The 
Satanic Verses's intimate deconstruction of the claims of revelation 
(showing carefully the way these come apart in practice and under the 
pressure of material facts and desires) is a critique of absolutism and the 
blind faith it demands. This is a big issue that impinges on political, 
religious, and personal life, and the book should be defended on those 
grounds rather than on the spurious proposition that it is a fiction and 
therefore not real. As David Lawton has recently argued, the book 
blasphemes, but not against God (who has Eternity to settle the score 
anyway) . It blasphemes against fundamentalism and the flawed yet 
deathly image of perfect order and authority it must construct so as to 
assert itself.37 Parody does important critical work here that sober 
critique could never hope to achieve. It is not just Rushdie that the fatwa 
seeks to discipline and destroy; it is the spirit of doubt, ambiguity, and 
criticism. Those of us who care about these principles have a lot more to defend 
than a maverick novelist. 
So, parody and the illusions we build with words impinge on material 
reality, and reality impinges back. The genre routinely loops back into 
something like mimesis, though it is a mimesis aware of the gulf between 
words and things, which the illusion of language bridges. It is not clear 
that pure deconstruction, though it runs on principles scarcely distin-
guishable from parody, is equipped to deal with such realistic issues, 
because it keeps deferring meaning into the play of language and keeps 
undermining the grounds on which propositions stand, as too meta-
physical. It is easy to see that Rushdie employs deconstructive methods 
in The Satanic Verses, and necessary to defend him for it, but it is 
harder to imagine what a rigorously deconstructive defense might look 
like. In the rhetorical flux surrounding the book, how would such a 
defense begin to take a position that is not always already paralyzingly 
unstable? 
Despite the note of accusation, I want to leave this as a genuinely open 
question, and propose to end this essay by recounting a parabolic story. In 
Swift's A Tale of a Tub, three brothers represent respectively the 
Roman Catholic Church, the Church of England, and the Nonconformist 
sects. The third brother, the Calvinist Jack, is the most textually 
obsessed. He is in the habit of reading the "Will" of the father (that is, 
the Bible) incessantly, and applying pieces of it to all sorts of extraneous 
and miraculous uses (such as bandages, medicines, and so forth). He 
treats it in an idolatrous manner as a master text which holds the 
solutions to all mysteries of faith and daily life, and he reads the world as 
a poor imitation of the textual truths contained in the Will.  His 
attachment to the Will is by no means an innocent or sincere expression of 
faith, however. It is an act of aggression and a pursuit of mastery 
through which he seeks to reimagine the world only so that he can be 
tyrant over it. And, because the world remains recalcitrant in many ways, 
it rapidly recedes in Jack's mind before the power of the Will, which can be 
bent hermeneutically into any shape his will desires. In the world of 
textual truth/delusion, he is omnipotent by virtue of his strong reading, 
and he prefers it that way. Any information to the contrary insults his 
faith and must be reasoned away. Consequently, Jack is in the habit of 
walking around town with his eyes closed, following not the carnal and 
lying perception provided by eyes, but the more sure guide of divine 
inspiration. The parodic text makes it clear that this will not work. With 
the confident faith of one who believes in nothing beyond the inspira-
tional text, Jack "would shut his Eyes as he walked along the Streets," and 
the habitual result was that, "he happened to bounce his Head aginst a 
Post, or fall into the Kennel."38 This is the satiric wisdom of parody. 
Whether Jacques and the deconstructive brethren are wise enough to 
resist the siren calls of complete hermeneutic dominion in the sunny 
realm of textuality and avoid such a drubbing, only time will tell. 
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versions, I have checked all direct quotations against the French texts and give references to 
the appropriate sources. Occasionally I have essayed corrections and/or introduced 
French words in brackets where I find the translations unsatisfactory, and I accept a share of 
any responsibility for distortions that translation may have introduced. 
2 Derrida, Limited Inc., p. 44; French ed., p. 88. 
3 Gregory L. Ulmer, "Of a Parodic Tone Recently Adopted in Criticism," New Literary 
History, 13 (1982), 546. 
4 See, for example, Tony Jackson, "Nihilism, Relativism, and Literary Theory," SubStance, 24, 
no. 3 (1995), 29-48, and Gordon C. F. Beams, "Derrida Dry: Iterating Iterability 
Analytically," Diacritics, 25, no. 3 (1995), 3-25. 
5 See Mark Edmundson, Literature against Philosophy, Plato to Derrida: A Defence of Poetry 
(Cambridge, 1995). 
6 This pattern of hermeneutic evolution conforms perfectly to what Gerald Graff has 
described as the "routinization of criticism" in "Rags to Riches to Routine," ch. 14 of 
Professing Literature.. An Institutional History (Chicago, 1987), p. 240. 
7 For an exposition and defense of this method of deconstruction, see Jonathan Culler, On 
Deconstruction (Ithaca, 1982); for an eloquent, detailed attack on it, see John M. Ellis, 
Against Deconstruction (Princeton, 1989); hereafter cited in text as AD. I surround 
"radicalism" with scare-quotes and qualify it with a dismissive adjective because "radical" is a 
word that has come to be used so lazily and ubiquitously that it often signifies little more than a 
desire on the writer's part to be considered exciting and up-to-date. 
8 The allegation that he is about to understand and disagree with an eloquent argument 
from Hillis Miller about the impossibility of conveying meaning in language strikes me as the 
unassailable part of M. H. Abrams's argument in "The Deconstructive Angel," Critical 
Inquiry, 3 (1977), 425-38. 
9 Paisley Livingston, "From Text to Work," in After Poststructuralism: Interdisciplinarity and 
Literary Theory, ed. Nancy Easterlin and Barbara Riebling (Evanston, Ill., 1993), pp. 91-104, 
shows economically how little there is up this particular garden path. See also John R. 
Searle's provocative assertions that a great deal of deconstructive literary theory has been 
flawed by a confusion between ontological and epistemological questions, and by 
Derrida's "pre-Wittgensteinian" refusal to accept that a concept can be a concept and admit of any 
impurity or imprecision (John R. Searle, "Literary Theory and its Discontents, "New 
Literary History, 25 [1994], 637-67). 
10 Ellis  makes this extrapolation with a careful hosti l i ty in chapter 3 of Against 
Deconstruction and, though slanted, his arguments, particularly about the banality of "soft" 
versions of deconstructive doctrines and the absurdity of "hard" versions, do not seem 
groundless. Jackson, in "Nihilism, Relativism, and Literary Theory," makes a less hostile 
case that Derrida does approach nihilistic relativism in his constant focus on indetermi-
nacy, which makes his occasional assertions that metaphysics remain indispensable look lame and 
lonely; for Jackson, though viewing Derrida as a nihilist is a misunderstanding, it is a very 
understandable misunderstanding. 
11 This list is meant to be illustrative, and is a long way short of being definitive. The 
specific texts referred to are Gayatri Spivak, "Translator's Preface," in Jacques Derrida, Of 
Grammatology, tr. Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore, 1976); Culler, On Deconstruction; 
Christopher Norris, Deconstruction: Theory and Practice (London, 1982; rev. 1991), and many 
other works, for example, The Truth about Postmodernism (Oxford, 1993); Vincent Leitch, 
Deconstructive 
Criticism: An Advanced Introduction (New York, 1983); Kevin Hart, The Trespass of the Sign: 
Deconstruction, Theology and Philosophy (Cambridge, 1989); Geoffrey Bennington, Legislations: 
The Politics of Deconstruction (London, 1994). 
12 Geoffrey Bennington, "Deconstruction and the Philosophers (The Very Idea)," in 
Legislations, pp. 11-60, provides a picturesque and excessive example of this "evil 
ministers" line of argument, casting so many anathemas on Derrida's myriad misrepresenters 
that it leaves the sanguine reader to wonder if anyone (except Bennington) has ever 
understood Derrida adequately. 
13 Hart, The Trespass of the Sign, p. 147. 
  14 Derrida, Of Grammatology, tr. Spivak, p. 158; De la grammatologie (Paris, 1967), p. 227. 
15 Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, tr. Alan Bass (Chicago, 1982), pp. 316-17; 
Marges de la philosophie (Paris, 1972), pp. 376-77. 
16 It is possible, of course, for a theory to be promulgated as a program for a textual 
practice that is then followed (for example, [post modernist avant-gardism and Soviet 
social realism), or for a theory to become so formalized that it dominates practice (for 
example, many Renaissance sonnets and much Byzantine iconography), but these 
reversals of order are unusual. Anyway, the issue of priority is less important than the point 
that actual theory and actual practice develop in long-winded dialogue out of concrete 
problems and desires. 
17 For a wide-ranging survey of the issues involved in parody, see Margaret A. Rose, 
Parody: Ancient, Modern, and Postmodern (Cambridge, 1993). 
18 This is classically Paul de Man's position and method, characterized bluntly thus: "It is 
therefore not a priori true that literature is a reliable source of information about 
anything but its own language" (Paul de Man, "The Resistance to Theory," Yale French 
Studies, 63 [1982], 11). 
19 Jacques Derrida, "Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion," in Limited Inc., p. 114; 
French ed., "Postface: vers une éthique de la discussion," p. 206. 
20 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 24; De la grammatologie, p. 39. 
21 I argue this case at length in my Swift's Parody (Cambridge, 1995). 
22 Victor Shklovsky, "A Parodying Novel: Sterne's Tristram Shandy," tr. W. George Isaak, in 
Lawrence Sterne: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. John Traugott (Englewood Cliffs, NJ., 
1968), p. 89. 
23 For a parallel discussion of parody as a process of erasure, in the Derridean sense, see 
my Swift's Parody, pp. 13-19. 
24 See Rose, Parody, and Linda Hutcheon, A Theory of Parody: The Teachings of Twentieth-
Century Art Forms (New York, 1985) for maps of this expansive territory. 
25 See Paula Backscheider, Daniel Defoe: His Life (Baltimore, 1989), pp. 84-105, for a 
description of the controversy. 
26 For a full account of the affair, see Michael Heyward, The Ern Malley Affair (London, 
1993). 
27 "After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop 
Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and that every thing in 
the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we were satisfied his doctrine is not 
true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson 
answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from 
it, `I refute it thus– (James Boswell, Life of Johnson, ed. R. W. Chapman [Oxford, 1980], p. 
333). 
28 Hutcheon, A Theory of Parody, pp. 69-83, is a good place to start in this large body of 
critical industry. Bakhtin's own work focuses constantly on these issues, and a starting 
point here is the essays gathered in Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. 
and tr. Michael Holquist and Caryl Emerson (Austin, Tex., 1981). 
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29 Roland Barthes, "The Death of the Author," in Image Music Text, tr. Stephen Heath 
(London, 1977), p. 147; "Le mort de l'auteur," in Le bruissement de la langue (Paris, 1984), 
p. 66. 
30 Jacques Derrida, Positions, tr. Alan Bass (Chicago, 1981), p. 28; Positions: Entretiens avec 
Henri Ronse, Julia Kristeva, Jean-Louis Houdebine, Guy Scarpetta (Paris, 1972), p. 40. 
31 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, tr. Barbara Johnson (Chicago, 1981), p. 168; La 
Dissemination (Paris, 1972), p. 194. The English translation has missed a line in this 
passage, which I have inserted in square brackets in my own translation. The two sentences 
from which the excision has come read: "Il apparaît dans son essence, comme la possibilité de 
sa propre duplication. C'est-à-dire, en termes platoniciens, de sa non-vérité la plus propre, 
de sa pseudo-vérité réfléchie dans l'icône, le phantasme ou le simulacre." 
32 Brian McHale, Postmodernist Fiction (London, 1987), pp. 99-101. 
33 Derrida, "Différance," in Margins, pp. 7-9; Marges, pp. 7-10. 
34 Derrida, Of Grammatology, pp. 144-45; De la grammatologie, pp. 207-8. I have removed 
the word "there" from the first line of this passage (between "representation" and 
"claims") as there is no warrant for it in the French text and I cannot make grammatical 
sense of the sentence with it in place; I suspect that it is a typographical error. 
35 de Man, "The Resistance to Theory," p. 11. 
36 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, tr. Roy Harris (London, 1983), p. 
118; Cours de linguistique generate (Paris, 1965), p. 166. 
37 David Lawton, Blasphemy (Philadelphia, 1993), pp. 177-88. 
38 Jonathan Swift, A Tale of a Tub, ed. A. C. Guthkelch and D. Nichol Smith, 2nd ed. 
(Oxford, 1958), p. 192. 
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